Paper Titles & Abstracts

The paper contributes to the assessment of the EU internal performance by contrasting the dramatically different strategies the EU has used to further the economic integration of its Southern and Eastern peripheries. The EU performance is analysed primarily with regards to the intended and unintended effects of the various mechanisms used by the EU to indirectly or directly alter state capacities and induce reorientation of state policies in its peripheries. The paper argues that the primary strategy of the EU in both cases was to 'get the incentives right" and embed these societies in a transnational market environment while forcing domestic states to reorient their policies towards increasing their economies' competitiveness. While there were early warnings that this might not work due to the lacking capacities of domestic states and non-state actors, the EU's only pro-active strategy for the Southern periphery was to increase intra-EU redistribution through the Structural Funds - contributing in several cases solely to the conserving of institutional status quo. Still worse, contrary to the original expectations, the EMU has contributed only to "getting the incentives wrong" and slowing down or preventing state reorientation in the South. In the East, however, the EU actions were led by the fear that the weak state capacities will hinder successful market integration. Thus, besides demanding the undertaking of neoliberal reforms, the EU strategy in the East focused on the strengthening of state capacities to promote these economies' ability to withstand competitive pressure within the European market.