Paper Titles & Abstracts

"Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The "political master" finds himself in the position of the "dilettante" who stands opposite the "expert"." (Max Weber 1958)One of the oldest discussions in studies on the European Union concerns the intergovernmental or supranational nature of the policy-making system. While the member states have delegated authority to the European Commission, the former still retain control through their role within the Council of Ministers. The ensuing power struggle between the Commission and the Member States for autonomy and control has led to a burgeoning literature applying principal-agent theory. Most studies in this regard inquire into the effectiveness of available control mechanisms as a precursor of agent-autonomy. The need for such control mechanisms arise as the member states-as-principals can only judge the outcome but not the actions by the agent. Instead of looking at control mechanisms, this paper suggests a stronger focus towards the capabilities of the administrations in the member states is warranted. If the member states cannot assess the impact or consequences of European legislation, it is not realistic to expect such principals to control the agent accordingly, regardless of the control mechanisms installed. This epistemic information asymmetry has largely been overlooked in the literature but could be an equally potent driver of Commission autonomy. The paper explores the causes, consequences and applicability of epistemic information asymmetry in European Trade Policy.