Paper Titles & Abstracts

Principal-Agent models of delegation have suggested different functions for which principals choose to delegate authority. In the case of EU Delegations, the most important are representation of EU interests, maintaining a channel for negotiations and dialogue as well as information gathering. In addition, EU Delegations are the field offices for the management of cooperation and development programmes, and the main outposts for DGs Trade and Enlargement.The European External Action Service - in itself a compound principal, as the intermediary for delegated authority from the Member States (MS) - is only one half of the story, with substantial competences, notably in the field of Neighbourhood and Trade policies, as well as Development and Cooperation under the control of the European Commission. In addition, with Member States more clearly voicing their interests and ownership in the EU's representation in the world, we test notion of 'double-agent' to characterize the situation of the EU Delegations vis-à-vis the MS and the Commission, as an expression of complex and interrelated chains of delegation, where the EU "Embassies" have to interact with and to answer to two distinct sets of principals. Agents can exploit conflicting preferences among their principals to increase their autonomy, as well as informational asymmetries arising between the principal and the agents. These become are more acute when control mechanisms are not functioning well and communication between the services at HQ is hampered by bureaucratic sclerosis, whereas in Delegations officials from different institutional provenience share direct formal and informal exchanges on a daily basis. Based on 28 interviews with EEAS and Commission officials the paper aims at studying this fuzzy principal-agent relationship, and uses the upcoming joint programming exercise, involving DG DEVCO and the EEAS, an opportunity to assess the level of autonomy of EU Delegations.