The paper investigates the role that the European Parliament played in the construction of the Banking Union with the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (2013-2014). While most of the analytical focus has been on the Council and the (big) member states, the European Commission and the European Central Bank, much less has been written on the European Parliament and the Banking Union. However, several observers suggested that the Parliament was a relevant and instrumental actor in the negotiations. Not only was the SRM negotiated under the ordinary legislative procedure, but the Parliament also appeared to have managed to extract institutional concessions in the case of the SRN, despite its lack of powers in this legislative file. The paper aims to evaluate to what extent the European Parliament has really been able to use its formal and informal powers to shape the creation of the Banking Union. In doing so, it engages with recent debates in the literature on the institutionalization/constitutionalization of the Parliament and its (allegedly) heightened role in the EU's legislative process.
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