40 years since the First Enlargement

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Draft paper

The significance of the 1967 application

Harold Wilson’s failed application for membership of the European Communities in 1967 has not been granted priority in general accounts of the history of Britain’s relations with the EEC.1 Labour Prime Minister Wilson was thought to be an opponent of membership when Labour took office in 1964, but from early 1965, and from around the time of the 1966 election, there were indications that Wilson’s attitude might be shifting. In the wake of the July 1966 sterling crisis, and the government’s imposition of a stringent deflation that put an end to the flagship policy of the National Plan, Wilson embarked on a membership initiative. In May 1967, he announced Britain’s application to the House of Commons. In late November 1967, following devaluation of sterling, the French President General de Gaulle prevented the opening of negotiations for entry.2 Although the government kept the ‘application on the table’, Britain’s relations with the European Community were kept in the news with the ‘Soames affair’ early in 1969, when de Gaulle appeared to offer Britain’s Ambassador in Paris Christopher Soames an Anglo-French deal.3

Thus, the 1967 application has been regarded as as an inevitable afterthought to Britain’s first attempt at entry in 1961-3, as a domestic party political gimmick, or as a puny cousin to the final, successful attempt.4 This paper suggests that in fact, 1967 should be regarded as a turning point. Wilson was sincere in his efforts to attain membership. In 1967, the British transformed their negotiating tactics and demanded no conditions in advance of membership. This stance ensured that the second application generated significant support amongst the European Community members and in the European Commission, preparing the way to attain membership under Edward Heath.5 The second application also united the British political class, as the House voted 488-62 in favour: a consensus that has not yet been broken by either party in power. Under a three line whip, 35 Labour MPs voted against, 260 voted in favour
and 51 abstained. It was a consensus, broadly speaking, of muted support for the basic reality that there was no alternative but membership, if Britain wished to remain a power with international reach. 1967 is also essential context for understanding Labour’s opposition to membership in the early 1970s and the reasons why Britain had a referendum on staying in, in 1975.

1. 

Harold Macmillan’s announcement of Britain’s first application for membership in July 1961 appeared to predict a dramatic transformation in Britain’s overseas orientation. In 1950, as the Six moved to the European Coal and Steel Community, and again in 1955, when the Six began to negotiate for the Common Market, Britain had adopted a stance of ‘benevolence towards, but non-participation in’ supranational integration. Britain wanted European integration to succeed, appreciating the enormous gains of Franco-German reconciliation, and Western European political and economic stability. But the British had not wanted to commit to joining a supranational European grouping, partly because of Britain’s international trade, partly because of the importance Britain attached to a relationship with America and the Commonwealth, and partly because of a long-standing sense that Britain was not just another European country.

Some in Whitehall did favour greater British involvement as the Europe ‘Six’ began negotiations on what became the EEC. But it was not until October 1959, following the failure of British proposals for a Free Trade Area, and the apparent inadequacies of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), that Macmillan asked the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to begin to investigate the price it would be worth paying to be economically associated with the Community. A Cabinet Committee report in May 1960, chaired by the Treasury’s Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Frank Lee, suggested that Britain had little choice but to seek ‘near identification’ with the Community. As the Chancellor, Derek Heathcoat-Amory, remarked, a decision to apply was a ‘political decision, with economic consequences’. As the EEC grew in strength, so it would come to replace Britain as the primary centre of power in Europe, and so America would come to look increasingly to France and West Germany as her principle partners across the Atlantic. Britain had to seek to enter the EEC in order to retain its international influence and thus, as James Ellison argues, although Macmillan’s application demonstrated ‘significant alterations’ in Britain’s
policy, it was not ‘a radical turning point… it represented a shift in British tactics to secure traditional goals’. In July 1961, following Cabinet discussions, Macmillan lodged a conditional application. Britain should seek to ascertain before making a final decision whether appropriate terms could be attained for Britain’s partners in the Commonwealth and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

After eighteen months of negotiations in Brussels, de Gaulle in his famous January 1963 press conference argued that Britain was not yet ready to enter the EEC. This effectively terminated the negotiations. De Gaulle acted unilaterally, and his veto caused a serious crisis, but he was careful to ground his rejection in the realities of the accession talks. Piers Ludlow has convincingly shown that important sections of Community opinion, including the European Commission, largely agreed with his assessment that the entry of an unready Britain would pose innumerable problems for the nascent Community, particularly as the Common Agricultural Policy evolved. Had the British been able to make more substantial concessions in the summer of 1962, the pressures on de Gaulle could have been greater. This was a lesson that the Foreign Office learnt fully, and as early as 1963/4, the European Economic Organisations Department drafted a new assessment should Britain get the chance to apply again. It was important, Sir Con O’Neill argued, for Britain to appeal to Community opinion, to demonstrate British acceptance of the *acquis communautaire* and to work to protect Britain’s interests from inside of the EEC.

Wilson, of course, hedged his bets during the first application. To put pressure on the Conservatives, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell at the September 1962 party conference said that accepting the terms available would be throwing away ‘1000 years of history’. There was little reason for Wilson, who wanted to emphasise Commonwealth regeneration, and the economic renewal of Britain through the National Plan, to revise Gaitskell’s position. Hence, as Wilson won the 1964 election with a tiny majority, there appeared little chance that Britain would apply for membership again in the near future.

2.

There has been a debate as to whether or not Wilson intended to make another application from this early point. New evidence from Wilson’s contacts with Scandinavian and West German socialist parties suggests that he knew full well Britain would have to seek membership. This may well be so, but Wilson was extremely adept juggling between
different audiences. Even though he no doubt appreciated that at some stage Britain would have to seek membership again, the crux was the terms under which Britain could seek to join. Wilson probably did want to steer towards membership in 1964-5, but very little suggests he was ready to make the kind of concessions that were made in 1967.

From the beginning of 1966, Wilson gave greater prominence to a fresh initiative towards the EEC. The immediate trigger was the Commonwealth crisis over Rhodesia. At the Special Commonwealth Conference in Lagos in 1965, Commonwealth members directly challenged Britain’s leadership. This also effectively brought to a close the already flagging efforts for a mutually regenerative Anglo-Commonwealth economic relationship. Wilson agreed to establish a committee to study the terms under which Britain might accede to the Community and after the March 1966 election, this committee was brought into the Cabinet structure as the Europe ‘E’ Committee.

The Europe Committee had not, by June 1966, reached a consensus as to the future course of action. Although the Foreign Office argued very strongly that Britain needed to demonstrate greater commitment towards eventual entry, the Treasury were very worried that an attempt to join could precipitate devaluation of the pound. The July 1966 sterling crisis, and the government’s decision to impose a strict deflation of the economy, crystallised debates, and left Wilson with little choice but to seek membership. The deflation meant that there was no chance to meeting the government’s growth targets under the National Plan. Britain was left without a convincing way of demonstrating how it intended to resume growth. Deflation also accelerated cuts in defence expenditure in the Far East. As Britain’s global role weakened, so there was nowhere else to go but Europe, if Britain wished to remain a power with international reach.

Between January and March 1967, Wilson and George Brown conducted a tour of the countries of the Six to see if the conditions existed for membership. Following this, in April 1967 Wilson took the decision through Cabinet. These extensive discussions emphasised the stark reality facing the government. It has commonly been supposed that Wilson secured agreement from the Cabinet by droning on and on about the terms of entry: ‘just boring our way in’, as Barbara Castle put it. In fact, he did the opposite. On 19 April, the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend in a memo to Wilson suggested that Wilson needed to separate the small number of ‘nevers’ from the large moderate opinion of ‘not yet’s’. The ‘not yet’s’ were
influenced by Defence Secretary Denis Healey’s argument that there was no point applying because de Gaulle was certain to veto.

On 20 April, Wilson put to the Cabinet a paper on the alternatives to membership. This paper argued that a North Atlantic Free Trade Area could not work, because Britain could only ever be a subservient partner. Going it Alone was a possibility, as Britain could sustain her economy, but it would require a dramatic change in Britain’s international posture: ‘in form we might be more free [outside], but it would be a freedom to submit to disagreeable necessities’.17 This was the rub. The Foreign Office had argued since 1964 that it Britain had to enter the European Community. Staying outside would impel Britain to a withering international role – outside the European Community, Britain would rapidly become neutral, a ‘greater Sweden’. Thus, there was really no alternative but to seek to join the European Community – a group of countries similarly sized to Britain, with complementary economies, and Britain’s nearest neighbours. Wilson argued that Britain could seek to lead this grouping, and also that ‘if rebuffed, we would have to seek to join again later’.18 Later, to the PLP, it was stated, ‘the government should state categorically that this, the second application, was a once-for-all exercise’.19 It was irrelevant if Britain’s application were rejected, because Britain had no choice but to join in the long as well as the short term.

Essentially, Wilson brought the Cabinet to see that there was nowhere else to go. These tactics worked with immediate effect. The Cabinet were tactically outmanoeuvred, but they also had to recognise the force of Wilson’s argument that they, and Britain, had no choice, if Britain wished to remain a power with international reach. This recognition effectively meant that there was not a great deal of opposition to the radical change in Britain’s negotiating posture. When Wilson announced Britain’s application to the House of Commons, he stated that Britain could accept the Treaty of Rome and promised only safeguards for New Zealand butter and lamb, and some provision for Commonwealth sugar producers.20 These changes were facilitated by the fact that trade with the developed Commonwealth, the main point of contestation during the first negotiations, had diversified since the early 1960s.

After the launch of Britain’s application, George Brown ensured that Britain’s application remained unconditional. In the Ministerial Committee on the Approach to Europe (EUR(M)), Douglas Jay, the President of the Board of Trade and one of the main opponents to a membership bid, overplayed the opposition hand by asking for retention of duty free imports
for all cereals, meat and dairy produce. As Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden, himself no enthusiast for the European initiative, put it, there was no point asking for more than the New Zealanders wanted. Secondly, Brown argued consistently that Britain’s immediate objective was not to decide what Britain could accept, but to bring de Gaulle to the negotiating table. They had to deliver a minimalist application in order to convince the Five to pressure de Gaulle to open talks. At the Western European Union in June, Brown announced Britain’s commitment to the Treaty of Rome and also to the Common Agricultural Policy. As to whether or not Britain could accept the agricultural levies, Brown said that Britain would ‘look forward to taking part as a full member of the Community in the negotiation of the agricultural finance arrangements for the period after 1969’.

Whether or not Wilson fully agreed with this stance is open to doubt. On a draft of a Foreign Office paper, Wilson wrote: ‘I’m still worried about the ease with which we are moving to the view that transitional arrangements are enough for agricultural levies. I have never accepted this’. John Robinson, First Secretary at Britain’s delegation to the Community, identified by Hugo Young as the driving force behind Foreign Office policy, and the architect of Britain’s negotiating strategy, replied that ‘we assumed that it would be our objective to be in the Community in time to take part in negotiating the new financial arrangements to apply after 1969’. Privately, officials like Robinson suspected that the Six would resist British entry until agricultural finance was settled. However, to the end of bringing the French to the negotiating table, Wilson was willing to accept it.

Of course, Wilson did not succeed in bringing the French to the negotiating table. On 28 November, de Gaulle confirmed that he would not endorse the opening of negotiations. He pointed to devaluation of the pound to argue that Britain was not ready to come in. Sterling’s weakness meant that Britain would not be able to accept the obligations of the CAP, as payment of the agricultural levies would be a ‘crushing burden’ on the British. Britain’s economic weakness also revealed Britain’s continued world power interests. The reserve role of sterling showed that Britain’s economy was incompatible with, and could break up, the growing financial unity of the Six.

The anticipation of de Gaulle’s veto, the haste with which it came, and the fact that negotiations did not open mean that Wilson’s application has been regarded as a pale imitation of Macmillan’s. However, there were crucial differences between the first and the
second failures. By 1967, France’s position in the Community had changed. EEC development in the late 1950s and early 1960s can be partially explained by the success of France’s tactic of threatening withdrawal. The empty chair crisis in 1965 revealed the limits of this approach. Once West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands called de Gaulle’s bluff, France was compelled to retreat.\textsuperscript{24} In 1966, the French withdrawal from the command structures of NATO was well managed by the Americans and the British, who resolved to continue despite the French position.\textsuperscript{25} The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 further undermined the credibility of de Gaulle’s vision of an alternative path to detente through a ‘Europe Européenne’ from the Atlantic to the Urals.\textsuperscript{26}

Amongst the European Community, in 1967 the European Commission formally supported Britain’s accession. The Commission issued an Opinion that negotiations should open, despite the anxieties for sterling. Britain’s uncluttered application, demanding no conditions in advance, indicated that Britain could accept the \textit{acquis communautaire}. Opinion within the Five, and also France, consequently supported enlarging the EEC.

Even after de Gaulle’s veto, Wilson opted to keep Britain’s application ‘on the table’. As Melissa Pine and others have shown, this continued pressure from the British led Pompidou to lift France’s veto to enlargement at the 1969 Hague Summit.\textsuperscript{27} Pompidou realised that France could not achieve its goals towards integration in other areas without giving ground on enlargement. Hence, although Pompidou’s good relations with Edward Heath no doubt smoothed the pathway to the agreement on British accession, it would also have been extremely difficult for Pompidou to have retreated from this agreement, provided that Britain continued to adhere to its revised negotiating stance.\textsuperscript{28} In Sir Con O’Neill’s words, if Britain continued to ‘swallow the lot’, Britain’s membership was now extremely likely.

3.

While Edward Heath advanced Britain towards membership of the EEC, Harold Wilson was not able to sustain the fragile consensus he had built in 1967 in support of the application. Labour’s arguments about Community membership in the early 1970s have often been regarded as the inevitable emergence of latent tension.\textsuperscript{29} While some MPs did have impassioned views about Britain’s entry, many did not. The majority of MPs, as Lynton Robins shows, had not taken a strong view about British membership in the 1960s. Labour’s
splits about whether or not Britain should participate in the European Community also say something about the context of the time.

The Special Conference in July 1971 was an important staging post in shaping the parameters of the debate. Eric Heffer, MP for Liverpool Walton, and formerly a supporter of membership, explained: ‘The issue we are faced with is basically the issue of how best do we get socialism’. From the perspective of many on the Labour left, entry into the EC was to participate in a capitalist club in which the interests of the working classes could not be protected. Partly, this was because of the adoption of the CAP, which would abandon the ‘120 year old policy of cheap food for this country’. Adoption of the CAP would also add a serious burden to the balance of payments, and could lift the price of food at a time of economic weakness. Partly, it was because the Treaty of Rome required the free movement of capital, and because the government might find it difficult to use state aids to industry that could distort competition. Furthermore, the membership of a European supranational organisation could compel future British governments to adopt economic policies which they did not support, for instance, VAT.

For some of the opponents of EC membership, it was important that Britain’s parliament had to be sovereign, not subjected to the economic conditions that entry into the EC were thought to create, and not subject to the limitations on sovereignty EC law would introduce. As Stepney MP Peter Shore put it at the Conference: ‘Do not be depressed by these feeble voices which seek to convince you, first, that you have no capacity to solve your own problems; secondly that the world of tomorrow is a world of vast aggregates, regional blocs from which it is death to be excluded, it is not; thirdly, do not fear, you have the power to stop this act of madness and to change the history of this country and to insist that we shall make arrangements for our future that are right - not for the CBI, and for Edward Heath but for the people of Britain’.

Supporters of British membership did make a case for Britain in Europe, but the main case was to restate the arguments Wilson had made. There was no alternative but entry into the EEC. John Mackintosh, MP for Berwick and East Lothian, led the charge at the Special Conference, arguing that the experience of the Wilson government demonstrated that Labour
could not build socialism in one country as the economy was not strong enough. The Commonwealth could not provide a sufficient basis for a British policy. The European socialists had feared the Common Market, but had grown to love it for what it had done for the European working classes: by securing economic growth. Internationalism, Mackintosh argued, had to begin at home, with a brotherhood with those sitting next to you. Essentially, the arguments had been made under the Wilson government: there was nowhere else to go. If those arguments were true three years ago, why were they not true now?  

This point was important in understanding the way in which divisions manifested. On 28 October, 1971, 29 MPs followed the Conservatives into the division lobbies to vote in favour of the Bill to implement the Treaty of Accession. The House of Commons voted 356-244 in favour. By this time, Wilson’s position was that those terms were not good enough, and Labour could not recommend acceptance. Clearly, the fact that Labour MPs were seen to be propping up a Conservative government was important in consolidating the sense of difference between pro- and anti-membership MPs. Many felt that it was more important to get rid of the Conservatives than to support Europe. Foot and Kinnock both commented, and Sir Arthur Irvine, MP for Liverpool Edge Hill, said: ‘the point is that I dislike the Conservatives more than I love Europe, and that just about sums it up for a lot of people’.  

For those who did favour membership, it was significant that they had already supported an application made by Wilson in the previous government. Former minister and MP for Dundee East, George Thomson said he would recommend the terms Heath now proposed. Following Wilson’s Conference speech in which he moved against the Conservative terms, former Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart asked Wilson: ‘what disturbed me about your speech on Saturday was that it had no warmth of feeling for Europe, no sense of regret that you could not approve the terms. If that was really your heart and mind about the matter, was it right to apply?’  

Jenkins believed that the Commons vote on the European Communities Bill in October 1971 was one of the historic votes of the century, and Bill Rodgers felt that the Labour party should be above party political point scoring on such an important issue. Many did of course feel pain at voting with the Conservatives – like Roy Hattersley – but they felt entitled to
exercise their consciences partly because Labour was turning away from what it had previously agreed. In other words, there was tension between the party as represented by the conference and NEC, and the party in parliament; as well as an emerging tension as to whether two party politics was adequate at all on a decision of such apparent importance.  

4.

The idea of holding a referendum on continued membership became prevalent partly because entry into the Communities was an issue of unprecedented constitutional significance. Douglas Jay had made the case for a referendum soon after the 1970 election and Tony Benn in November 1970, while still a supporter of entry, had written to his constituents to recommend a referendum: ‘if people are not to participate in this decision, no-one will ever take participation seriously again… it would be a very curious thing to try to take Britain into a new political unity with a huge potential for the future by a process that implied that the British public were unfit to see its historical importance for themselves’.  

Pro-membership MPs such as Jo Grimond and Shirley Williams accepted the idea – Williams held a ‘democratic populist feeling’ – that it was difficult to oppose a referendum. The case in favour was strengthened because neither party manifesto in 1970 had wholeheartedly endorsed British participation. The Conservatives had said that if the right terms could be negotiated, it would be in Britain’s long term interests to join; Labour had said that while negotiations would be ‘pressed with determination’, Britain would only enter if British and essential Commonwealth interests could be safeguarded. Hence, it was easy to argue that only now the terms were known that the ‘full hearted consent of the Parliament and people’ should be sought.

However, the argument in favour of a referendum was not just one of principle. The anti-membership MPs believed the people were turning against membership, and therefore that a referendum, correctly framed, would vote no. The decision of a previous Labour government, supported by Parliament, could be overturned by asking the people directly. The ‘full hearted consent’ of the British people was a very powerful weapon to bring to bear against the authority of Westminster to implement this historic change. In this way, the referendum could be seen as part of a dialogue about the relationship between Westminster, party and people; a
dialogue which became prominent in the later 1970s and 1980s as the Party divided over the way in which the leader should be elected, the role of the Conference in forging the manifesto and whether a CLP can deselect an MP.

The common image of the referendum was Callaghan’s one of a ‘little rubber life raft’ to clamber aboard, to hold together the diverging wings of the Party. Butler and Kitzinger argue that it kept the Party together: it eased tension by transferring responsibility to the electorate and the agreement to differ enabled both sides to speak their mind.38 Stephen Wall shows that the referendum certainly helped Wilson to preserve his quiet support for the principle of membership while the conference turned against membership.39 Nevertheless, Chris Cotton argues that the referendum also served to consolidate division, as the experience of fighting it created memories of bitter feuding in the party.40 Stephen Meredith also emphasises that the referendum brought to light cleavages not just between left and right of the party, but also amongst the revisionist right.41 Some Labour MPs began to believe that they had more in common with pro-membership Liberals, or even Conservatives.

It is also impossible to see the referendum as putting an end to the question.42 The referendum voted 2:1 in favour of staying in, but it is still contested. Benn wrote: ‘I believe our failure [to win the referendum] was mainly due to the enormous strength of the forces ranged against us. These included the majority of the Labour Cabinet, the entire leadership of the Conservative Party, all but one of our national newspapers and the entire business community’.43 The battle for Labour’s soul, and indeed the issue of Britain’s membership of the European Community, was not over.

Conclusion

The 1967 application was extremely significant. It was significant because it demonstrated that Britain had no alternative but to join the European Community, if it wished to remain a power with international reach. Wilson recognised, probably from an early point in his government, that Britain had no choice. In this sense, entry into the European Community, while it was a significant change in Britain’s overseas orientation, was also a shift in tactics
to sustain the constant objective of international influence. Wilson’s application united Britain’s governing political class in favour of membership, in a consensus that has not yet been broken by either party in power. It could be suggested that this posture, of muted support for the idea that the alternatives are worse, lies at the core of Britain’s relations with the EEC. Wilson also oversaw a revolutionary change in Britain’s negotiating strategy. In order to attain membership, the British would ‘swallow the lot’, except safeguards for specific issues. This stance built support for Britain’s accession within the European Community, and opened the way for Edward Heath to secure membership.

Secondly, Wilson’s Cabinet essentially accepted that Britain had no choice but to apply for membership. But the timing of the application, coming as it did after the July 1966 deflationary package, keenly demonstrated how much Britain’s accession was connected to the management of Britain’s decline. It was a fragile consensus, bought from a ‘defeated’ Cabinet, as Benn put it later. Once Labour went into opposition, this consensus eroded, in the context of the left’s disappointment as to what had been done under Wilson, and consequent reassertions of what it should mean to be a socialist party.

The context of Britain’s parliamentary system was also important. Membership of the EC became a central issue for those on the left who sought to transform the relationship between labour and capital, primarily because it was perceived that membership would reduce Britain’s ability to determine its own laws. Tony Benn wrote: ‘the kind of changes we have just been discussing will only be possible if we retain control of the management of our economy and the conduct of our affairs’. This analysis also helps to explain the divisions that emerged on the right of the party. For Crosland, Callaghan or Healey, Labour’s domestic programme, and keeping the Conservatives out of office, was more important than membership of the EC. Thus, Labour’s response to Britain’s membership of the Community demonstrates the nature, and the limits of a ‘winner takes it all’ two party system. Whoever won the battle of what the Labour party was for could hope to implement their vision via the ballot box. Vernon Bogdanor expressed it thus: ‘it is our tradition of thinking in terms of undivided sovereignty which inhibits a constructive approach to European questions’.

Finally, although the referendum helped Wilson to preserve his position and to maintain support in principle for membership, the referendum was also divisive. The arguments about
having a referendum arose in part because of a serious concern about the constitutional impact in Britain of membership of the Community. Nevertheless, the referendum debate was also a party political issue, an extension of the debate about where in the party power should lie, itself a reflection of the growing disputes about the meaning and future of socialism.

Opponents of membership thought that the people would vote against membership; and this in itself was a challenge to the authority of Westminster, as the previous Parliament had supported Britain’s accession to the Community. In this way, the referendum debate seemed to illustrate an anxiety about Britain’s democratic institutions: as Heath put it in 1974, who governs Britain? Furthermore, as membership was one element in the broader struggle for the soul of the Labour party, the referendum did not settle it. The issues of economic strategy, party, industrial and national democracy as well as British membership of the Community, continued to divide the Labour party, and the question of Britain’s membership of the EEC and later European Union were not laid to rest in the country.


16 Parr, *Britain’s Policy*, 70-100.

17 The National Archives [TNA] CAB129/129, C(67)52, Alternatives to Membership of the EEC, Cabinet Secretary, 14 April 1967

18 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)22nd, 20 April 1967.

19 PLP, Party meeting, 27 April 1967.


27 See note 5.
28 Furby, Revival and Success.
31 Peter Shore, Speech at Special Conference, p.18
32 Peter Shore, Special Conference, p.19.
33 John Mackintosh, Special Conference, pp.28-9.
35 Michael Stewart papers, STWT7/1/2, Stewart to Wilson, Churchill College Archive Centre.
37 Anthony King, Britain says yes: The 1975 Referendum on the Common Market (1977), p.58
39 Wall, Britain and the European Communities, chapter 10.
40 Christopher Cotton, The Labour Party and Membership of the European Economic Community, 1961-83, (PhD, University of Cambridge, 2010).
44 Benn, Arguments for Socialism, p.163
45 Meredith, Labours old and new, p.88.