Nearly eight years after the emergence of the Eurozone's crisis, the question of whether the EU's governance has become more supranational or not remains (Dehousse, 2016; Fabbrini and Puetter, 2016), while at the same time our belief that some Member-States may dominate over others is increasing (Fabbrini, 2016). Who governs Europe? Under what conditions some Member-States may dominate over the other? The main objective of this study is to provide a different interpretation of the evolution of the integration process stressing the importance of the feature of asymmetry in the integration process. We will not emphasize on the structural asymmetries of the Eurozone (Scharpf, 2010), but rather on how the asymmetrical power of Member-States affect the integration process in high-policy issues. This aspect changes the nature of the integration process and the theoretical approach of intergovernmentalism. The era after the crisis and the debate about which path we should follow on economic governance in the EU, stresses in our opinion, to a significant degree the importance of asymmetrical intergovernmentalism.
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