This paper draws on the concept of emergency politics and the concomitant notion of the state of exception (as they have evolved and been applied in European constitutional and political history) to shed light on how the European Union's handling of the ongoing crisis has affected the EU's institutional architecture and operation. The paper draws on empirical evidence from post-2008 EMU-related reforms and demonstrates that - overall - the crisis has been used (by the supporters of the TINA - there is no alternative - doctrine) to undermine the progress towards parliamentarisation that the EU has made via the Treaty of Lisbon which, tellingly, was signed before the onset of the crisis. Unlike the reforms that are associated with that treaty and were partly meant to render the political and ideological element much more prominent, the EU's crisis management has tended to reinforce the logic of the TINA doctrine and the intergovernmental element of the EU's institutional edifice.
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