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Social Democracy and European Integration

The papers will examine the origin of the preferences of social democratic parties in France, Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Greece vis-à-vis the process of European integration since 1945.

Contact: Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos (socdem2@bbk.ac.uk) www.bbk.ac.uk/polsoc/news/current-news/DGDconference for latest details

Conference report: Social Democracy and European Integration

The objective of the conference was to provide a forum for the discussion of the origins (and the development) of the preferences of social democratic parties on European integration and to discuss whether (and the extent to which) they have been shaped by interests, institutions and ideas.  This collaborative research programme (which is funded by the Leverhulme Trust) covers the French Parti Socialiste, the German SPD, the British Labour Party, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the Swedish SAP.  The contributors discussed the historical origins of social democratic party preferences on European integration (construed in terms of the scope, aims and the institutions of integration) and have also assessed the utility of the instrumental view of integration, the ‘obfuscation thesis’ and the ‘dependence thesis’. 

Christoph Egle (Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main) discussed the impact of the ‘shadow of German history’ and interests (office-seeking and vote-seeking) on the SPD’s preferences.  Although the party opposed the specific form that European integration took in the early 1950s (because its leader considered that it would hinder the unification of Germany), it subsequently came to support the European policy of the CDU.  Indeed, limited are the exceptions to the bipartisan consensus that underpins Germany’s European policy.  He also demonstrated that ‘when SPD-led governments played a formative role in European integration, it was not necessarily because of ambitious (social democratic) European goals. It was much more a consequence of the aforementioned Europapolitik als Staatsraison and the sheer ‘size’ of the Federal Republic of Germany, that almost automatically required it to play a leading role within the EU’ (Egle 2007, 30-31).  In terms of the ‘instrumental view’, Egle argued that ‘European integration was in fact pursued by German social democracy in terms of instrumental reasons, but not in order to modernise the state or the economy; rather, securing peace was the primary objective. That was already the case after World War I. In addition, after World War II, Germany’s single means to overcome the burden of German history and to gain back credibility was to abstain from any kind of ‘national’ foreign policy and, as a consequence, to foster European integration. Therefore, whereas economic considerations clearly supported European integration, they have not been the driving power of the SPD’s European policy.  Nevertheless, instrumental views could be detected in the cases of the economic crisis management by the Schmidt government (EMS) and the (failed) attempts to employ the EC/EU as a countervailing power to the constraints of globalisation’ (Egle 2007, 31).  Egle also rejected both the ‘obfuscation thesis’ and the ‘dependence thesis’.

Philippe Marlière (UCL) examined the origin and evolution of the preferences of the French Socialist Party.  He argued that economic and diplomatic considerations dictated to the French PS the ‘emphatic choice in favour of European integration after the Second World War’, while the exigencies of competition from the Gaullists and the Communists account for the persistence the persistence of a steadfast pro-European agenda during the 1950s and 1960s.  This positive stance has recently given way to internal contestation as a result of which ‘the PS has had tone down its traditional support in favour of European integration’ (Marlière 2007, 2). 

Hussein Kassim (Birkbeck) argued that geo-political considerations have played a major role in the formation of the Labour Party’s preferences on European integration.  Moreover, ‘three-party competition, single party government and the oppositional nature of party politics that characterise the Westminster system had an important impact’ (Kassim 2007, 2).  In addition, although the party leader was relatively weak when the party was in opposition, ‘the incumbent did enjoy wider room for manoeuvre when in government’ (Kassim 2007, 2). 

Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos (Birkbeck) and Argyris Passas (Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens) made four claims (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas 2007, 2-3).  First, PASOK did not perform a U-turn because it did not have a clearly elaborated and explicitly articulated policy on European integration from which to depart.  This is demonstrated not by the absence of a rhetorically robust thesis but by the absence of a clear definition of the kind of Europe that it stood for in the second half of the 1970s.  In the absence of a response to this question, it is impossible to refer to a ‘U-turn’.  Second, electoral, economic and geo-strategic interests, ideas (populism, initially, modernisation along social democratic lines in the second half of the 1990s) and, more importantly, institutions (specifically, the autonomy of the leader vis-à-vis the party organisation and membership) played a major role in the gradual definition of PASOK’s views on European integration.  The interplay of these factors and their outcome are time sensitive.  Although it is exemplified by specific events (such as the decision to support the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the determined pursuit of accession to the third stage of EMU) it ought to be construed as a process.  Third, the gradual elaboration and determined pursuit of advanced theses regarding the future of Europe – couched in the social democratic tradition as well as practical considerations - was the hallmark of the Simitis era (1996-2004); it is only during this time that PASOK (then the ruling party) had a clear objective regarding the future of Europe as well as a clear strategy regarding the country’s involvement therein.  Finally, although this marked the high point in the history of the party’s policy on European integration, their adoption and pursuit have been ephemeral since they do not appear to enjoy the support of powerful ‘carriers’ or a majority within the party; in that sense, the Simitis era can be likened to a Europeanist ‘intermezzo’.  Indeed, as will be demonstrated in this paper, under George A. Papandreou, PASOK appears to have abandoned the left-wing federalist Europeanism doggedly pursued under the leadership of Costas Simitis. 

Finally, Göran Von Sydow (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm) demonstrated - on the basis of a paper that he co-authored with Karl-Magnus Johansson (Södertörns Högskola) - the importance of the party’s internal division, the lack of party-voter congruence and the difficult balancing act performed by the party’s leadership.  Indeed, once major changes in economic conditions and the broader strategic environment forced the party leadership to consider membership of the EU, it had to balance the realities of integration with competing demands from the members as well as the historically defined (i) neutrality and (ii) the dominant conception of the welfare state as an overwhelmingly national project.  The authors argued that ‘[t]he internal division is still a constraining factor on the European policies of the SAP. The risks of splinters, defection, dealignment and realignment still constitute real challenges for the party leadership.  The understanding of the EU as primarily intergovernmental cooperation, the pragmatic focus on results rather than visions as well as the argument of how the EU can shelter the (national) welfare state in era of globalisation all bear signs of party-cues familiar to the traditional, reformist world view of the SAP’ (Johansson and Von Sydow 2007, 24).  Since accession in 1995, the party has placed particular emphasis on pragmatism and results at the European level whilst trying to increase political autonomy at the national level. 

One common theme identified by the contributors is the autonomous role performed by the party leadership.  In terms of the content of their current preferences, although there is broad agreement on the scope of integration, there is considerable divergence in terms of its aims as well as its institutional configuration. 

References

Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssis G. and Argyris G. Passas. 2007. The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement and European integration: the primacy of the leader. Paper presented at the conference on social democracy and European integration, Birkbeck College, 20-21 April.

Egle, Christoph. 2007. The German SPD’s vision on European integration: always one step behind?  Paper presented at the conference on social democracy and European integration, Birkbeck College, 20-21 April.

Johansson, Karl Magnus and Göran Von Sydow. 2007. Swedish social democracy and European integration: leadership constrained.  Paper presented at the conference on social democracy and European integration, Birkbeck College, 20-21 April.

Kassim, Hussein. 2007. The Labour Party and Europe: from outright scepticism to tepid support.  Paper presented at the conference on social democracy and European integration, Birkbeck College, 20-21 April. 

Marlière, Philippe. 2007. The French Socialist Party and European integration: faltering Europeanism.  Paper presented at the conference on social democracy and European integration, Birkbeck College, 20-21 April. 

Last Modified: Friday, 11 May 2007
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