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Reflections of an Irish EU Council Presidency

An analysis of the last Irish EU Council Presidency with a focus upon the proposed constitutional treaty and the Presidency's response to major internal and external security challenges. Each of six panels will be organised around presentations from practitioners and analysts. In most circumstances this will entail the Minister or senior civil servant responsible for that issue area presenting their analysis of the presidency with a subsequent critique offered by a noted academic in that field. Each panel is to be moderated and will include a Q&A discussion to conclude. Keynote address envisaged by Taoiseach/senior minister.

Contact: Ben Tonra, Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin (ben.tonra@ucd.ie)

Programme (37kb PDF file)

Conference Report

The Conference was held at the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin on 4-5 November 2004, as part of a series of conferences organised under the auspices of UACES on the subject of successive EU Council presidencies. Each session examined and traced the development of a specific area/issue throughout Ireland’s Presidency of the Union. Consequently the agenda was necessarily broad.
From EU enlargement to enhanced co-operation on areas of Justice and Home Affairs, the Irish Presidency has been broadly perceived as a success. By examining the decisions taken under the Irish Presidency the conference aimed to offer constructive analysis to our EU partners and succeeding Presidencies. The conference opened with introductory remarks from the Director-General of the Institute of European Affairs Mr Alan Dukes, and Professor Ben Tonra, Director of the Dublin European Institute at University College Dublin.

Thursday, 4 November 2004
10:30am Session One: Justice and Home Affairs
Speaker: Mr Paul Hickey, International Division, Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Discussant: Professor Finbarr McAuley, Faculty of Law, University College Dublin
Chairperson: Nora Owen, Institute of European Affairs and former Minister for Justice

Nora Owen, former Minister for Justice opened the session on Justice and Home Affairs. As chairperson her assessment of the Irish Presidency was very favourable and in her introduction she provided the context for the discussion that followed. The issue of Justice and Home Affairs really came to the fore in Ireland’s 1996 Presidency of the Union. This area has developed significantly since that time and is now extremely close people’s hearts. There are many issues still to resolve such as inter alia, mutual recognition on terrorism/migration. Moreover, the issue of unanimous voting remains central to discussions in this area.
Paul Hickey agreed with the chairperson’s assessment and in his presentation outlined the main areas brought forward by the Irish Presidency. As Presidency, five salient issues provided positive incentives for progress in the area of Justice and Home Affairs: treaty deadlines, the completion of the Tampere programme, the tenure of both the commission and parliament drawing to a close, enlargement and opt outs for Ireland.
From the outset it was clear many of the deadlines would not be achieved. Given this reality, Ireland focused on several issues/areas, which it was thought, could be developed. These included: the Treaty of Amsterdam imperatives, taking forward the Tampere programme and general Action Plans and Programmes. We focused our efforts on operational co-operation and we emphasised the fight against drugs and organised crime. As Presidency, Ireland set a number of legislative priorities that we aimed to deliver. We chose our deliverables and followed their progress closely through the various Working Groups and the Article 36 Working Group. However, we also went outside the conventional council structures to secure momentum. The end of both the Parliament and Commission assisted us over the line with many of our deliverables - we found compromise was possible.
As Presidency, we found the enlargement process provided its own momentum. As the date for enlargement arrived, a sense of urgency grew. Many felt particular items needed to progress quickly. Finally, Ireland’s willingness to prioritise areas, which we opt out of or are not involved in, helped build support and fostered a positive atmosphere between countries in the Council.
The tragic bombings in Madrid on March 11^th acted as a catalyst adding further momentum to achieve greater co-operation in the area of terrorism. The follow-up to the European Council declaration on combating terrorism that was issued on 25^th March became a central focus for our Presidency.
After listing some of the many legislative achievements of the Irish Presidency, Mr Hickey stressed the significant effort and commitment shown by all during the Presidency. Small states attribute priority to the Presidency. This combined with the political will from Minister’s in different briefs led to its success. As Presidency, we also developed a very fruitful working relationship with the Council Secretariat and Commission.
As discussant, Professor Finbarr McAuley congratulated the successes achieved by the Irish Presidency. However, he emphasised several general points regarding the Justice and Home Affairs area. One of the significant problems facing lawmakers in Europe is the nature of the system itself. Difficulties’ surrounding the ratification of laws has meant much of the legislation has not contributed to combating crime. It remains easy for member states to sign-up to various legislative measures, but never implement them.
Consequently, is it better to streamline laws? – Maybe not. There is still no guarantee that if the Commission introduces laws, the problems will be solved. For example, if we look at the European arrest warrant it is clear that the big member states are still dragging their feet. Moreover, QMV will only exacerbate the problem. Law is not just a matter of making laws, but of making rules by consensus. If member states so not recognise these laws and their legitimacy, the streamline process will not work. This will then led to problems in the larger project of European integration. In conclusion, Professor McAuley asked, how could we talk about harmonising penalties for crimes, when the rules themselves are not yet harmonised?

12:00pm Session Two: Constitutional Treaty/IGC
Speaker: Rory Montgomery, Head of IGC Section, Department of Foreign Affairs
Discussant: Tony Brown, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin
Chairperson: Paul Gillespie, Foreign Editor, The Irish Times

Rory Montgomery began by outlining the process surrounding the conclusion of the Constitutional Treaty. So, how was agreement reached in Brussels? First off, no planning had gone into chairing the IGC because it was not clear that the Italians would fail. The mandate from the Council in December 2003 was to consult and report to the Council in March. There was a general feeling that it would be particularly difficult to get agreement. However, the Taosieach was determined to give it go. In one of his first speeches to the European Parliament on 9 January 2004, he told the Parliament we were prepared and asked why would issues be easier to resolve further down the line. He promised the ‘fullest possible consultations’.
As Presidency, Ireland began by exploring compromises and identifying member states’ stances. We also started floating some initial frameworks. In February and March the Taoiseach began to talk with people frequently. We then began to formulate in private what a possible outcome might look like. It became clear then that the difficulties were not insurmountable.
Before the European Council in March several significant issues remained, such as: the big institutional questions, QMV over tax/justice etc and non-institutional issues. The defence issue - which had been resolved under the Italian Presidency - made it easier for Ireland. A total of around 20-30 issues remained opened. We needed to initiate a process of negotiation; however, we did not want too many meetings. Three meetings were agreed to and we decided to start on less difficult issues and work our way along. Significantly, we cleared up a large number of issues at the European Council. This was exactly what the Taoiseach wanted. On the 8 April 2004, the Taoiseach sent a letter to colleagues setting out the broad parameters for negotiations.
Next, the Taoiseach wanted to do a pre-European Council tour of capitals. It was his contention that this would help built trust. He did this despite official advice to the contrary. This turned out to be important political capital and by the June European Council a deal seemed possible. The Taosieach was very blunt as to why his proposals would work and by the end of Council meeting in June we had one or two issues to resolve, but general agreement had been reached.  
As Presidency, we learnt a number of clear lessons from this process. Firstly, the central importance of political capital as an impetus to reach decision cannot be underestimated. Second, our officials knew the issues well and everyone involved developed a clear trust in each other. Third, there was a single line of command, which allowed for clear operational control of the entire process. Finally, the Council Secretariat as a resource was indispensable and the Commission and Parliament were also helpful. 
As discussant, Tony Brown congratulated the achievements of the Irish Presidency and emphasised the successes achieved by the Department of Foreign Affairs. He stressed the importance of the political commitment that Rory had spoken of. For example, on the 1^st of July 2004, the Taoiseach and the Foreign Minister Brian Cowen participated in a three-hour debate on the convention issue. It is very important not to underestimate the impact of this political commitment.
The first skeleton draft treaty, which was completed in October 2002, galvanised the convention, and also provided the framework we have today.  It provided a clear focus for continuing negotiations. The gathering of such diverse groupings, which included politicians, civil society, academics and practitioners, meant that certain key issues would become important. Central to the success of the convention was the idea of consensus and the requirement to produce a single document.

15:00pm Session Three: The Lisbon Agenda
Speaker: Phil Lynch, Head of EU Affairs, Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Discussant: Professor Loukas Tsoukalis, President, ELIAMEP, Athens
Chairperson: Brendan Keenan, Group Financial Editor, Independent Newspaper

In session three, Phil Lynch outlined the approach adopted by the Presidency towards the Lisbon Agenda and highlighted Ireland’s achievements.
The Lisbon Agenda is a vast set of agenda’s founded on a broad set of policy elements.
As Presidency, Ireland aimed to bring together the complex nature of this process and tried to make it work. It was our conclusion that there is not a lot wrong with the Lisbon Agenda. However, by looking closely one can see that most of the groups that meet are more linear than interrelated. Moreover, from an economic point of view, the agenda is too big to narrowly focus and some of the demands on the environment had been excessive.
As Presidency, we set several qualitative and quantitative targets to be reached. We opened up all methods of co-ordination and established guidelines, which were set against the best benchmarks in the world. Despite the faults that exist in the Lisbon Agenda we decided to push ahead.  We adopted a more policy orientated integration process. In total, our policy was based on nearly two years of preparatory work.
In November 2003, the Taoiseach wrote to heads of State or Government to set out Ireland’s policy line during our Presidency. These included the need to promote growth, foster competitiveness, deliver more employment, ensure sustainable growth and look forward to the 2005 mid-term review. In February 2004, he wrote again urging all participants to push ahead and keep the momentum moving. The Taoiseach believed the conclusions of the Spring Council should be clear and succinct - this was achieved.
Competitiveness became central to our Presidency programme. One of the central challenges was to bring an end to the linear thinking that exists. We needed to follow-up our priorities for action. As a result of our work the competitiveness Council now holds policy debate horizontally, through a process of simplification and integration. As Presidency, we found that small incremental steps leading ultimately to a more holistic view proved successful.
As discussant, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis highlighted some salient issues regarding the Lisbon Agenda. Professor Tsoukalis commended the Irish Presidency for the success achieved, especially given the constraints. In 2000, the Lisbon Agenda was viewed as a new way forward. The idea was simple, more of everything. However, one of the central flaws of the strategy was in its design. The proposal that the various elements of the agenda could be implemented using only ‘soft co-ordination’ and deadlines was incorrect. A new approach is now required to increase the effectiveness of the Lisbon strategy.
So, why has progress been so slow? Professor Tsoukalis contends that we have been operating in an unfavourable macro-economic environment. In a context where there exists no binding legal regulation, domestic policy invariably wins out over European policy. At present, there exists no regulation strong enough to deal with this situation. The method of relying on benchmarking and peer pressure is not working. On the one hand, benchmarking only works when we have consensus and unfortunately this consensus is generally not strong enough to survive political tests. On the other hand, peer pressure is naming, but where is the shaming?
Moreover, these problems are further exacerbated by the lack of knowledge in most parliaments around Europe regarding the central flaws at the heart of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). The central flaws of these guidelines are that the carrots and sticks are extremely weak.
So what next for the Lisbon Agenda? It is significant to note the important limitations within the Lisbon strategy. The convergence criterion that existed within EMU, which mobilised member states, do not exist within Lisbon. In offering some practical suggestions Professor Tsoukalis points to the need to rationalise and prioritise the strategy. Perhaps some formal incentives could be introduced through the EU budget. The irony is that reform is necessary for growth and growth is necessary for reform. It is clear now that when the Strategy was launched member states were not ready to follow the agenda set out.

16:30pm Session Four: Key Note Address
Speakers: Brigid Laffan, University College Dublin, Tony Brown, Institute of European Affairs, Brendan Halligan, Institute of European Affairs.
Chairperson: Dr Garret FitzGerald, Chancellor, National University of Ireland and former Taoiseach.

In this session the panel offered a positive critique of the Irish Presidency. Each speaker praised the commitment at both political and official level in government throughout the Presidency period. For Ireland, as a small member state, the EU Presidency requires an enormous effort given our resources. Therefore, it is significant that it has broadly been perceived as a great success. Historically, Irish Presidencies have had a number of central threads running through their implementation. These include, good planning, competent teams, excellent networks, no big initiatives and being modest in nature. The 2004 Irish Presidency is a good case study in mediation.

Friday 5 November 2004
09:00am Session Five: External Relations and CFSP
Speaker: Tony Mannix, Department of Foreign Affairs
Discussant: Professor Hanna Ojanen, Finnish Institute of International Relations
Chairperson: Professor Ben Tonra, Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin

In session five the speaker Mr Tony Mannix, provided a comprehensive profile of Ireland’s Presidency goals and achievements in the broad field of external relations. This was an exciting and challenging six months. Ireland assumed responsibility for shaping and guiding the Union’s foreign policy and we are seen as having promoted effectively the interests of the Union as a whole. The key strategies underscored by the Presidency included, support for multilateralism, the transatlantic partnership, human rights, Africa and the European security strategy. Central to the success of our Presidency was the ability to adapt when required. To achieve this, a common EU stance was central.

Multilateralism
The Presidency worked to use the growing political weight of the EU to support an effective multilateral system with a strengthened UN at its heart. Several tasks were accomplished in this regard: The implementation of the 2003 EU-UN Declaration, the EU’s contribution to the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. And finally, the Presidency promoted the theme of effective multilateralism with the UN at its core to the forefront of the Union’s political dialogue with all external partners, notably the US, Russia, China, the African Union, Latin America and Caribbean Group and ASEM. In addition, the Presidency worked closely with the Commission and member states and in consultation with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to ensure that the influence of the EU was brought to bear in favour of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, on the basis of the Secretary-General’s proposals.

The Transatlantic Partnership
As Presidency, Ireland held Summit meetings with both the United States and Canada. Regarding the US, we focused on improving the atmosphere and substance of the relationship. From the outset, we set out to manage the relationship strategically. We concentrated on already existing cooperation and on reaching agreement where we shared common concerns. Regarding Canada, the aim for the Presidency was to add further momentum to this already close partnership. We achieved a degree of measured success through the adoption of both the EU-Canada partnership agreement and the Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement (TIEA).

Human Rights
Specific targets in the Human Rights area were fully achieved and Union solidarity was maintained, including at a challenging 60^th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights.

Africa
As Presidency, Ireland worked to strengthen EU-Africa dialogue at all levels. Landmark agreements were reached with the Africa Union on effective multilateralism and Africa’s external debt. Furthermore, the African Peace Facility was launched and became operational. The first tranche of funds from the 250 million euro Facility was used to support the African Union mission in Darfur, Western Sudan.

European Security Strategy
As Presidency, we delivered on each of the four mandates given by the December 2003 European Council when it adopted the European Security Strategy. The European Security Strategy included a mandate on effective multilateralism, on combating terrorism, on the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East and on the comprehensive EU approach to Bosnia and Herzegovna.
Tony Mannix then expanded on his area of responsibility, the Middle East Peace Process. EU efforts to promote implementation of the Road Map and the role of the Quartet were actively pursued. This was done despite a very difficult situation on the ground. The ‘Tullamore Declaration’ and the positive outcome of the Quartet meeting in New York on 4 May 2004, coupled with the agreement reached at the March European Council have all added significantly to the process for a peaceful resolution.
As discussant, Dr Hanna Ojanen, began by praising the efforts of the Irish Presidency. Moreover, Dr Ojanen identified some salient issues to be addressed. First, if we examine the Union in the area of CFSP it is clear we are already at a new stage. It seems that before we fully implement specific aspects recently adopted the Union is trying to figure out how to adopt new measures. Second, an assessment of the ESDP field highlights that the implementation of the Constitutional Treaty has already started.
Third, the relationship between the EU and the UN is very important. This link can offer legitimacy that the EU so often needs to achieve its aims. This is a reciprocal, but ambiguous process. The UN needs a rapid action force and the EU needs the UN to offer legitimacy. However, as the EU wants to respect the UN, it does not want to be bound by it.
Another important area identified by Dr Ojanen is language. The use of the term neutrality can be troublesome. It is an elastic term. Finland has now adopted a non-aligned position regarding most military issues. In many ways Finland is more UN-minded than EU-minded.

10:30am Session Six: Enlargement
Speaker: Ambassador Bisserka Benisheva, Bulgarian Ambassador to Ireland
Discussant: Dr Thilo Bodenstein, Free University of Berlin
Chairperson: Jean-Pierre Langellier, Dublin and London Correspondent, Le Monde

In session six, Ambassador Benisheva provided a lucid account of the enlargement process from an outsider’s perspective. The 1^st of May 2004 was an unforgettable experience. The event itself was short and yet beautiful. The Ambassador lauded Ireland’s role in facilitating the integration process. As Presidency, Ireland was tasked with the responsibility to integrate the largest ever enlargement of the Union and despite the need to negotiate and conclude the IGC, the tragic events of March 11^th in Madrid, and the conclusion of Bulgarian accession negotiations, this happened faultlessly.
The significance of enlargement cannot be underestimated. It demonstrates a single-minded determination to put behind the artificial division of Europe. As Presidency, Ireland has contributed significantly to this process.
As discussant, Dr Thilo Bodenstein offered a more sober examination of the Irish Presidency. While Ireland did achieve a significant amount during its six months, Ireland as a small member state could have achieved more.
First, regarding the financial perspectives, Ireland could have been more fruitful. It is unlikely Germany and France will offer more money to the EU budget, arguing that structural funds are a ‘waste of time.’ Ireland was in a position of offer a different and more positive perspective. Ireland could have used its position as Presidency to teach new small members how to use structural funds successfully. Second, given that the new member states have to join the Euro and have to meet the EMU 2 arrangement of 3 per cent, Ireland once again could have done more to offer lessons learned. France and Germany are not in a position to teach these lessons.
For Ireland, being small and once poor offers a certain credibility that the larger members do not have. A possible ‘Dublin’ strategy highlighting Ireland’s successful chosen path would have been advantageous. Given the new balance between small and large member states Dr Bodenstein believes Ireland could have done more to offer lessons to our new small partners.

12:00pm Roundtable: “The Next ‘Irish’ Presidency –New Rules but the Same Strategy?”
Speaker: Professor Brigid Laffan, University College Dublin
Discussant: Jean-Pierre Langellier, Le Monde; Ruairi Quinn, TD
Chairperson: Alan Dukes, Director-General, Institute of European Affairs
 

In sum, the overall assessment of Ireland’s Presidency of the EU was extremely positive. So, what are the benefits of a Presidency? Brigid Laffan identified five advantages to hosting a Presidency. First, the domestic system increases its knowledge of EU affairs. Second, our politicians and officials gain a deep knowledge of each member states viewpoint. Third, as Presidency you are at the heart of communications in the Union. Fourth, officials get a chance to flourish and shine on a bigger stage. And finally, the Presidency offers an element of ‘soft’ communication in society. Citizen’s often become more cognisant of the EU.
For Ireland, the failure of the Nice Treaty was a critical juncture. It is important therefore to build on this Presidency and to systematically formulate a policy to communicate the EU over the next 18 months on the run up to the Constitutional Treaty referendum. The key is to make sure Irish people feel comfortable with Europe in all its aspects.
Deputy Ruairi Quinn offered another positive assessment of Ireland’s Presidency, but further emphasised the need for Ireland to become makers of the agenda rather than takers of the agenda. In an effort to achieve this he proposes we should aim to keep a permanent Presidency mindset. The panel agreed that a permanent corner of our active Presidency consciousness should be kept alive. 
 

Conference organiser: Professor Ben Tonra, Dublin European Institut
Research assistant: Frank Groome, Dublin European Institute

Last Modified: Thursday, 03 March 2005
idD410436  +27April2004  ©UACES 2004