Home > Conferences and Events > Previous Events > Events 2004 > 0403

The Italian Council Presidency in 2003

London, 21 May 2004

Ref: 0403

The conference is from 09:45 - 17:00. Registration and coffee are from 09:30.

Session 1: Priorities of the Italian Presidency Evaluated

Session 2: Developments in Foreign Policy

Session 3: Developments in Security & Defence Policy & the Area of Freedom, Security & Justice

Session 4: Presiding the IGC: A View from Inside

Contact: UACES for further information and to register.

Programme (44kb PDF file)

Conference Report

The Conference was held at the European Institute of the London School of Economics on 21 May 2004, as part of a series of conferences organised under the auspices of UACES on the subject of successive Council presidencies. The sessions focused on the institution of the presidency, initiatives managed under its Italian leadership in the second half of 2003, and developments that had been ongoing through successive presidencies.

Although the issue with which the Presidency has been associated is the breakdown of the Intergovernmental Conference that was supposed to agree the text of the EU Constitution drafted by the Convention, notable advances were made in other policy dossiers. These were the subjects of two of the sessions at the conference. Session 2 looked to the Developments in Foreign Policy, while Session 3 focused on defence policy, as well as the security issues of immigration and asylum policy. The day started with a session on the priorities of the Italian presidency and concluded with a view of what had occurred at the IGC itself. 

Session 1 – The Priorities of the Italian presidency evaluated
The introductory talk given by David Hine (Christ Church, Oxford) provided an overview of the Italian presidency. Roger Casale MP, the PPS to the ministerial team at the Foreign Office and Chairman of the All-Party British-Italian Parliamentary Group spoke as the discussant.

Council presidencies provide a national handle through which the government holding the presidency can try to emphasise national policy priorities. As an example, the Swedish government placed particular emphasis on pursuing a “transparency” agenda during its presidency in 2001. Many of the objectives, such as the Lisbon agenda, are predictable and often associated with ongoing policy issues.

Measurement of its success in policy terms and the conclusion of legislative dossiers, as well as analysis of whether the outcomes and priorities can tell us anything about the supposed development of Euroscepticism in Italian party politics are the basis of an appraisal of the Italian presidency.

Presidencies have to focus on a limited set of areas in order to be seen to conclude successfully. Governments have varied in terms of this success, often needing to learn about Council machinations over the years, and requiring the good will of other countries. The Italian presidency was tainted by the perception of failure to conclude the IGC, which had been its main policy objective. The decision of Silvio Berlusconi to support the military intervention against Iraq distanced the Italian government from those of France and Germany, although Berlusconi was careful not to entirely burn his bridges with Chirac and Schröder.

During the first year of the Berlusconi government, there was a certain anxiety about the perceptions of other EU governments. It was for this reason that the very moderate Renato Ruggiero was appointed as Foreign Minister in 2001, able to provide policy continuity with the previous holder of the post, Lamberto Dini. However, it soon became clear that Ruggiero was ill suited to comply with the more strident and apparently Eurosceptic tone of certain members of the Berlusconi government. The real dispute emerged following the Laeken Council at the end of 2001, concerning who would be the representative of the Italian government. The resignation of Ruggiero in January 2002 eliminated him as a contender, and for nearly a year the Italian Foreign Minister was Berlusconi himself. As the representative of the Italian government at the Convention, Gianfranco Fini worked constructively with the opposition’s two parliamentary representatives: Lamberto Dini and Valdo Spini. However, the appointment of Francesco Speroni, of the Lega Nord, as Fini’s deputy contributed to the increasing Eurosceptic image of the government.

Besides completing the IGC, the other targets of the Presidency were to promote the internal market and economic growth in the EU, and airline and financial services deregulation. It supported the Lisbon agenda, and welfare and labour market reform – domestically unpopular policy that it sought to Europeanise – while pursuing a security agenda in the light of immigration and the terrorist threat. It also emphasised the EU’s future enlargement to Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Three southern states: Spain, Greece, and Italy, had held the presidency in quick succession, albeit interspersed by Denmark, and these had placed particular emphasis on Euro-Med dialogue, however the approach of the Italian presidency to the Middle East question broke with foreign policy traditions of Italy and most of southern Europe by favouring the Israelis over the Palestinians. Despite the neo-liberal commitment in social and economic policies in favour of deregulation, the presidency concluded agreements on public works concentrating on road building, including a proposed bridge over the Straits of Messina, to be co-financed through structural funds – a traditional Keynesian instrument pursued according to consistent practice in Italy.

Although the theory and practice of the presidency lacked coherence, it is quite usual for a neo-liberal agenda to be blended with neo-keynesian measures that consolidate a government’s domestic support. The Italian presidency was certainly committed to strengthening Italy’s economic performance, which meant that the competitiveness and deregulation agenda was not incompatible with the emphasis on public works and non-market populism.

While the approach to Iraq allowed for foreign policy convergence between the British and Italian governments, the same was true with regard to the competitiveness agenda. However, in terms of the politics of the Eurozone, Giulio Tremonti, in his role as President of the €uro12 resisted attempts to punish France and Germany for their growing deficits, not just because of Italy’s expected deficit in years to come, but through a reluctance to risk losing the two most powerful EU governments as allies during the presidency.

What does the experience of the Presidency signify for the supposed Euroscepticism that has recently been identified in Italian party politics? During 2003, Italy was at the bottom of the growth league for the Eurozone and Berlusconi successfully played the card that the Euro had been an unnecessary shock on the Italian economy, for which the previous centre-left governments, and Commission President Romano Prodi, in particular, were responsible. Despite the positions taken by members of the Lega Nord such as Francesco Speroni, in representing the Italian government at the Convention, it would be a mistake to categorise this as real Euroscepticism, since the government had every reason to undermine Prodi (and collaterally the EU) for reasons of domestic political competition. Soft Euroscepticism (and often in a harder form) has developed in most member states, so its arrival in Italy is unremarkable. It is indicative of a changing Europe, in which the EU decides on issues of real politics, and in which national electorates choose politicians to defend the national interest. It is also an effect of Italy’s new bipolarism and a source of electoral competition between centre-left and centre-right that is not uncommon elsewhere in Europe.

In his role as discussant, Roger Casale concurred with the points already raised, and offered a view of the British government on the Italian presidency. The convergence between the British and Italians on certain policy issues allowed advances to be made in those fields. So far as the British government was concerned, successful outcomes were reached on migration issues, defence policy, the energy sector, and financial services deregulation. The commitment to increase spending in research and development to three percent of GDP is close to Britain’s priorities concerning the Lisbon agenda.

The British have been looking to the successes of the Italian presidency in pursuing the competitiveness agenda, in terms of preparing the programme for the British presidency that will take place in the second half of 2005. Italy is now more assertive than in the past, but remains strongly pro-European. There are strong common interests, whether in economic policy or in creating a constitutional structure for the EU that will function well. With this in mind, the British wanted to conclude the IGC rapidly but not at any cost.

Session 2 – Developments in Foreign Policy

The starting point of the talk given by Professor Christopher Hill and Elisabetta Brighi (LSE) was that the performance of the Italian presidency could have been worse, taking into account the tensions caused by the war in Iraq and the ‘big bang’ of enlargement. The Berlusconi government has Eurosceptic elements and this came out clearly in dealing with EU foreign policy. Whereas in the past, pro-Atlanticism and pro-Europeanism could be reconciled, these two trends are now moving apart and Italy is not the only country facing a difficult choice between Europe and the US. Furthermore, personality affects the conduct of foreign policy, even more in the case of Berlusconi, who tended to treat foreign policy as a private affair, to the detriment of the Foreign Ministry. While bilateral diplomacy carried the day during the Italian presidency, multilateralism was made more difficult by Italy’s stance.

A ‘score card’ comparing the list of foreign policy objectives stated by the Italian presidency in its programme with the end of term report reveals that the list of achievements in foreign policy was disappointing. The state of relations with France, Britain, and Germany, the limited international credibility of Italy, and negative attitudes towards Berlusconi weakened the presidency. Furthermore, the Italian government treated European choices more instrumentally than in the past.

Professor Robert Sakwa (University of Kent) discussed the relations between the EU and Russia in the second semester of 2003, and in a longer-term context. Reference was made to Berlusconi’s praise for Putin, and the lack of ‘block discipline’ in the EU in its relations with Russia, which the Russian authorities are very willing to exploit. The joining of the new member states further complicated the issue, for the new members are asking for a redefinition of EU foreign policy. Furthermore, different stances were taken by the Italian presidency and the Commission in dealing with Putin. Overall, relations with Russia raise the issue of integration without accession, as the latter is not an available instrument in dealing with Russia.

Session 3 – Developments in Defence and Freedom, Security and Justice

In Session 3, Wyn Rees (Nottingham) was the first to speak on ‘European Defence: The Debate about Autonomy’.

Although the tensions between EU members over Iraq caused a storm, the case of Kosovo in 1999 had already provided the stimulation for developing a rudimentary defence policy at EU level. The tone set by France and Germany during 2003 was driven by their reaction to events in Iraq, including the desire for a European defence autonomous from NATO. This aspiration was shared by Belgium and Luxembourg.

The Atlanticism of Antonio Martino, the Minister of Defence, drove Italy’s policy, placing the government at some distance from the defence aspirations of the other EU founding states. The contentious issue was the creation of EU planning capacity. Under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a military committee located in the Council was created, although it had no separate planning capacity from NATO. Under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements that obtained until 2003, the EU could take military action without NATO, only if NATO itself did not wish to be involved. Within this context, the establishment of the EU’s independent planning capacity was highly significant.

Flexibility in defence had been proposed at Nice in 2000, but the British were unwilling to countenance it. The British view changed when it became clear that if Belgium, France, Germany were not allowed to proceed, they would establish a ‘Schengen’-type structure outside the EU. Agreement was reached to set up a planning cell on occasions when NATO or alternative mission leaderships were rejected. This was counterbalanced by an EU/NATO liaison arrangement.

The principle of setting up a European Armaments Agency to develop procurement and Research and Development programmes in defence was agreed, although this is unlikely to take shape before 2010.

Throughout 2003, the attitude of the US government was hostile, warning that the survival of NATO was at risk. There was fear of a European caucus leaving USA out of NATO decisions, although experience has shown that the EU steps in only after NATO, as in Macedonia and Bosnia. The stated need for continued liaison undoubtedly reassured the US.

Although agreements were concluded during the Italian presidency, Italy did not really set the agenda in this period. Britain has been proactive in ESDP since 1997, and has favoured its development in cooperative manner with NATO. While the French have always wanted a truly autonomous capability, the real shift was acceptance by the British that failure to make progress would result in military agreements between some of the founder EU states, outside of the EU architecture.

Professor Andrew Geddes (Liverpool) then made a contribution on ‘Immigration, Asylum and the Italian Presidency’.

The question of migration policy is of interest, since Italy only has a relatively recent history of immigration, as opposed to emigration, and from many countries. Migrants coming to Italy find themselves in low skilled, agricultural, tourism or domestic service-oriented employment, primarily in the clandestine economy.

Italians understand that irregular migration is an employment rather than a border regulation issue. Informal employment in the unofficial economy is not inspected in Britain, which maintains tough but not impenetrable border controls. Meanwhile, irregular employment is an important economic factor in Southern Europe, and consequently enjoys significant political support from economic interests. The approach of Fini has been consistent with the objective of ‘getting rid’ of illegal immigration through regularisation rather than deportation.

The political party with the most strident anti-immigration tone is the Lega Nord, which has quarrelled in government with Alleanza Nazionale over the issue of giving the right to vote to immigrants. Although Gianfranco Fini also opposes illegal immigration, the challenge for him is to integrate those who are in Italy legally and wanting to work. This pragmatic political choice assists with the further legitimation of the ‘post-fascists’ and recognises that Italy is a major external entry point into the EU from both the Balkans and the Southern Mediterranean. The approach of Fini marked a noted policy departure from a previous attempt by the Italian government to build an alliance with Britain and Spain at the Seville Council of 2002 in order to link development aid to the curbing of migration flows. This had been opposed in particular by Sweden and Germany. The counter-suggestion of Bossi to only regularise immigrants who pass language tests in local Italian dialects is hardly a serious policy proposal.

What did this situation mean for the Italian presidency, with respect to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? The Convention’s proposals for deciding much of the legislation in this area by QMV and Codecision with the European Parliament were maintained during the IGC. The room for manoeuvre of the presidency was constrained by domestic factors: factionalism between the coalition partners of the Italian government, notably the spat between Bossi and Fini; the absence of any capacity to regulate migration flows into Italy; and the fact that populist reactions to migration occur from within the government, rather than from the opposition.

Session 4 – Presiding the IGC: A view from inside

This session provided two different insider perspectives on the IGC: a view from the Italian presidency and a view from the British delegation taking part in the negotiation. The Italian view was the main concern of the Presidency was to avoid watering down the text of the Convention, and this inevitably affected the working methods adopted in the IGC. In the IGC, The main points of negotiations concerned: the extension of QMV; the method for “re-weighting” votes and calculating the threshold for QMV; the composition of the Commission; and the preamble. Once the presidency was handed over to Ireland, the Italian delegation became more adamant on the need to insert revision clauses, especially those concerning the extension of QMV in certain areas, and the place of religion in the preamble.

The British view distinguished three phases in the negotiations: position taking; serious negotiations; and the European Council in December 2003. The Franco-German insistence on approving the Convention draft weighed a great deal with the Italian presidency, although its chairmanship was impartial. The second accomplishment of the presidency was the transparency in managing the activities of the IGC, with official documents including those regarding the preferences of governments over Council formations being made public on an IGC website. The British were satisfied with the protection of their ‘red lines’ or non-negotiable areas, concerned with retaining unanimity for tax, social security, CFSP and ESDP. These had been respected both in the Convention draft and throughout the IGC negotiations. At the end, it was not possible to reconcile national interests on the key issue of the threshold for QMV and the principle of the double majority (states and population), issues on which the British decided to take a neutral position.

Three criticisms can be made of the way in which the IGC was managed. The first was that an insufficient number of gatherings to conduct the negotiations were scheduled, with only a handful of meetings of the General Affairs Council. Secondly, controversial issues were left open, which the presidency would have done better to pin down at an earlier stage. A third criticism, not related to the presidency but, instead, to the process of treaty reform as a whole, was that that the draft discussed by the IGC had been produced by the Convention, hence the participants in the IGC initially felt no proprietorship of it.

Co-rapporteurs and co-organisers of the conference:
    Giacomo Benedetto (London School of Economics)
    Lucia Quaglia (University of Limerick)

Last modified: Thursday, 03 March 2005
idD410403  +26Nov2003  ©UACES 2003